Кіберпростір: міжнародно-правове регулювання та практика застосування прецедентного права МС ООН

The article is devoted to the study of international legal regulation of cyberspace and the practice of applying the case law of the International Court of Justice to cyberattacks. The author analyses that the rules of international law are an important basis for the international legal order in cyberspace, since 1) it is the place where relations requiring international legal regulation are established; 2) misuse of information technologies poses significant threats not only to individuals, but also to States and the international community as a whole. The principle of equality and self-determination of peoples is important for the regulation of relations in cyberspace: no one can interfere with information systems. It is proved that currently, there is no official international legal recognition of information attacks as aggression or other cyber tools as weapons, so the qualification of the use of cyber weapons as a violation of the principle of non-use of force is problematic. It is established that despite the fact that international law does not contain clear criteria for applying the armed attack standard, it is important to analyse to what extent cyber attacks can be qualified as an armed attack. Cyberattacks that undermine or destroy essential security assets and belong to the highest category may qualify as an armed attack. It is proved that the investigation of cyberattacks between states is complicated by the lack of a single set of rules in international law on the provision of evidence. Although there is no single standard of proof applicable to all cases involving international liability for cyber operations, claims of self-defence against cyber operations must be proved by convincing evidence. It is noted that in considering cases of cyber-attacks, the ICJ gives greater evidentiary weight to official documents of States and international organisations. The ICJ is cautious in formulating its conclusions: if it is objectively difficult for a party to the case to meet the burden of proof because direct evidence is under the territorial control of the other party, including its cyber infrastructure, a more liberal use of findings of fact is permissible, provided that they leave no room for doubt.