Bench Strength: How Powerful Are Supreme Courts in Common Law Countries Really?

This thesis examines the extent of judicial power exercised by the top constitutional courts in common law countries, using judicial review as a proxy for this power. I analyze three apex constitutional courts—the supreme courts of the United States, India, and Canada—as they all engage in strong-form judicial review and have been referred to at different times by various scholars as “the most powerful court in the world.” To frame my analysis, I explore how these courts have evolved in power throughout their histories. I employ comparative historical analysis (CHA) and construct a typology that accounts for how these courts, initially weak institutions lacking the power of enforcement and financial resources, develop influence and legitimacy over time through comparative historical analysis (CHA) and a typology that reflects their evolution. I find that while these courts exert more influence and are more consequential as constitutional stakeholders than they were at their inception, they still face inherent weaknesses and engage in arbitrage with the other branches of government to accrue legitimacy and power. Thus, while strong-form courts appear stronger than at their inception, claims of juristocracy are not validated.