Vagueness and the Vermont Long-Arm Statute

The authority of state courts to assert jurisdiction over the person of nonresidents has expanded markedly since the days of Pennoyer v. Neff. Different theories for asserting jurisdiction over individuals, as opposed to corporations, have been discarded. For jurisdictional purposes, the common law classifications of in personam, in rem and quasi in rem have been abandoned. "Minimum contacts" has become the all-embracing rationale for reviewing any assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by a state court. But if "minimum contacts" has replaced these former concepts and served to simplify and unify the requirements of due process, it has also lulled the legislature of Vermont into a certain complacency regarding its role in delineating the jurisdiction of its courts. In Avery v. Bender the Vermont Supreme Court held that its courts could not properly assert jurisdiction over the nonresident beneficiaries and the administrator of a trust, although part of the trust property was within the state. The following discussion is addressed to an inquiry of whether a state legislature can delineate the bounds of its courts' jurisdiction by mere reference to minimum contacts without violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, can such a statute be challenged on the grounds of vagueness, and if so, is § 913(b) unconstitutionally vague?