Mental Abnormality in the Maine Criminal Code: Section 58 (1-A)

The law surrounding the insanity defense has always been complex and problematic. Since the promulgation of the M'Naghten test in 1843, courts and legislators have attempted to articulate a clear and easily understood definition of insanity. Legal scholars have created an overwhelming volume of literature on such important aspects of the defense as the role of psychiatrists in a jury trial, the appropriateness of the diminished capacity defense, and the constitutionality of imposing the burden of proving insanity on the defendant. Even the necessity of retaining the defense has been questioned. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has recently confronted a new problem raised by the statutory synthesis of the legal doctrines relevant to the insanity defense. The remainder of this Comment will examine the historical development of the theories of mens rea and the insanity defense as it relates to the creation of section 58(1-A). Further discussion will focus on the procedures invoked when one introduces evidence of mental abnormality as well as on the constitutional issues generated by the enactment or possible repeal of section 58(1-A). This Comment contends that the structure of modern criminal codes and the implications of recent constitutional cases have resulted in a loss of harmony between the doctrines of mens rea and the insanity defense. Although once coordinated in order to allow the state to hold all defendants who committed a forbidden act, they now permit a loophole (section 58(1-A)) to exist through which Royal Burnham and other defendants may slip. An argument will be presented, however, that the interrelationship between these two criminal law theories and that of blameworthiness and punishment requires the inclusion of section 58(1-A) in the Maine Criminal Code. Finally, a brief review of various proposals for improving this area of the law and a possible solution for Maine will be presented.