Less-excludable Mechanism for DAOs in Public Good Auctions

With the rise of smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged in public good auctions, allowing "small" bidders to gather together and enlarge their influence in high-valued auctions. However, models and mechanisms in the existing research literature do not guarantee non-excludability, which is a main property of public goods. As such, some members of the winning DAO may be explicitly prevented from accessing the public good. This side effect leads to regrouping of small bidders within the DAO to have a larger say in the final outcome. In particular, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the best regrouping of bidders that maximizes the total bidding power of a DAO. We also prove that such a regrouping is less-excludable, better aligning the needs of the entire DAO and the nature of public goods. Next, notice that members of a DAO in public good auctions often have a positive externality among themselves. Thus we introduce a collective factor into the members' utility functions. We further extend the mechanism's allocation for each member to allow for partial access to the public good. Under the new model, we propose a mechanism that is incentive compatible in generic games and achieves higher social welfare as well as less-excludable allocations.