FPT-Approximability of Stable Matching Problems

We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (2) Min-BP-SRI: Given a stable roommates instance, find a matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (3) Max-SMTI: Given a stable marriage instance with preferences containing ties, find a maximum-size stable matching. The first two problems are known to be NP-hard to approximate to any constant factor and W[1]-hard with respect to $β$, making the existence of an EPTAS or FPT-algorithms unlikely. We show that they are W[1]-hard with respect to $β$ to approximate to any function of $β$. This means that unless FPT=W[1], there is no FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter $β$. The last problem (Max-SMTI) is known to be NP-hard to approximate to factor-29/33 and W[1]-hard with respect to the number of ties. We complement this and present an FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter "number of agents with ties".

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ArXiv.org
Published
2025-08-13
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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article

FPT-Approximability of Stable Matching Problems

ArXiv.org
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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FPT-Approximability of Stable Matching Problems

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Abstract

We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (2) Min-BP-SRI: Given a stable roommates instance, find a matching that minimizes the number $β$ of blocking pairs; (3) Max-SMTI: Given a stable marriage instance with preferences containing ties, find a maximum-size stable matching. The first two problems are known to be NP-hard to approximate to any constant factor and W[1]-hard with respect to $β$, making the existence of an EPTAS or FPT-algorithms unlikely. We show that they are W[1]-hard with respect to $β$ to approximate to any function of $β$. This means that unless FPT=W[1], there is no FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter $β$. The last problem (Max-SMTI) is known to be NP-hard to approximate to factor-29/33 and W[1]-hard with respect to the number of ties. We complement this and present an FPT-approximation scheme for the parameter "number of agents with ties".

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Game Theory and Voting Systems
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