Observational Knowledge in Intentional Acts

In the philosophy of action, a question arises as to how we should understand the nature of observational knowledge in intentional acts. In particular, it is unclear whether the practical knowledge agents characteristically have of what they are doing relies on observation and, if so, how it is reliant on observation. In my thesis, I will attempt to show that the following views are incorrect ways to understand the nature of observational knowledge in intentional acts: the Anscombean No Observational View, that practical knowledge is not reliant on observational at all; Schwenkler’s Practical-Observation View that practical knowledge is non-observational but grounded in practical perception; and Paul’s Inferential View that practical knowledge is inferred from our observations of the world around us. I will argue that my Dual-Fit View is the correct option that states our observational knowledge used when we act intentionally is speculative with a practical end.