The Prisoner's Dilemma in Modern Dating: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Distributed Online Dating Platforms

Online dating has revolutionized how people meet potential partners, with approximately 38% of single American adults having experimented with it. While location-based services have enhanced these platforms' popularity, they often fail to promote genuine interactions, instead fostering a culture of superficiality. This paper examines the application of game theory, specifically the Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibria, to modern dating platforms. Through analysis of user behavior patterns and market dynamics, we demonstrate how current platform structures lead to asymmetric equilibria where men adopt indiscriminate matching strategies while women become increasingly selective. We examine existing solutions implemented by various dating platforms and propose a novel rating-based feedback mechanism to promote more genuine interactions. Our findings suggest that current dating platform dynamics often result in a "tragedy of the commons'' scenario but can be improved through carefully designed mechanisms that align individual incentives with collective benefits.