Regulatory Capture and Market Concentration in Icelandic Agriculture: The Case of the Búvörulög and Producer Cartels

This paper presents an in-depth investigation into Iceland’s Búvörulög (Act No. 99/1993) and the controversial 2024 amendment (Law No. 30/2024), which legalized cartel-like behavior among dominant producer organizations. We trace the evolution of the legal framework, map the corporate and political networks behind Kaupfélag Skagfirðinga (KS), and expose how policy changes have systematically marginalized independent farmers and weakened market competition. The research combines legal analysis, corporate mapping, financial flows, and accountability tables—providing a model for understanding regulatory capture and market engineering. The findings call for urgent public scrutiny and reform, as the current system entrenches monopoly power, undermines rural communities, and limits Iceland’s future economic resilience.