Just Economics or Hidden Politics? Political Determinants for the Adoption of a Mandatory Private Pension Pillar

This paper researches the role of political factors in the adoption of mandatory private pensions. With reference to partisan theory and its application in pension reform, as well as Orenstein’s (2008) model of transnational actor influence, I conduct an empirical analysis of mandatory private pension adoption in EU countries using a mixed methods approach. I run binary time-series cross-section and survival analyses for the time frame of 1980-2020 and further investigate the case of Romania in-depth, as well as World Bank projects for pension reform in six other countries. My main findings are that both the ideology of the governing party and the involvement of the World Bank are influential in the adoption and implementation process of mandatory private pensions. While the results for political variables are mainly consistent, demographic considerations are insignificant throughout the whole analysis. Further, the World Bank plays a vital role, enabling pension pillarisation through its technical assistance, but also through its actions as a political actor, insisting on pillarisation despite lacking political will and naming and shaming governments that deviate from its pillarisation plan.