Democratic Meddling in Republican Primaries: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

The strategy of Democratic meddling in Republican primaries has gained prominence, most notably in the 2022 U.S. election cycle. This thesis investigates the tactic's theoretical underpinnings and empirical effectiveness. I first develop a framework that examines the conditions under which meddling is a rationalizable strategy. I then apply a within-precinct research design, using election data from 2022, to evaluate the relationship between Democratic meddling and electoral outcomes. My results indicate a significant positive association between a candidate's meddling status and their relative performance in the Republican primary. But I find that facing one of these targeted candidates brings only a modest boost to a Democratic candidate's vote share. The discrepancy between meddling's impact in the Republican primary and its impact in the general election challenges conventional wisdom surrounding the strategy and constrains the types of races that warrant meddling, given its costs, tradeoffs, and risks. This research offers the first comprehensive evaluation of this increasingly mainstream political tactic, highlighting its rational bounds and bringing into question its broader effectiveness.