West Africa's Constitutional Defender? Reevaluating ECOWAS in the Age of Geopolitical Fracture

This thesis seeks to understand why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has sometimes succeeded—and at other times failed—to reverse unconstitutional seizures or retentions of power within its member states. Specifically, it investigates whether the type of sanctions ECOWAS imposes and the degree of international support it receives influence the outcome of its interventions. To answer this question, I undertook the first comprehensive analysis of every instance in which ECOWAS has attempted to restore constitutional order within a member state since the adoption of its 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which established a zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional rule. My findings suggest that while the severity of sanctions employed by ECOWAS does not appear to be a consistent determinant of success, the level of international support for its efforts is critical. In fact, ECOWAS has only ever succeeded when it enjoyed strong, near-unanimous backing from key international actors—and it has never succeeded when it faced active opposition from even a single major power. These results indicate that ECOWAS’ coercive power is highly contingent on a supportive international environment. Therefore, as great power competition resurges and the rules-based international order weakens, the bloc’s ability to enforce constitutional governance is likely to erode considerably.