Der Begriff der Gesinnung bei Kant

Kant’s concept of ‘Gesinnung’ causes enormous difficulties when translated into foreign languages. This is related to substantive problems in the understanding of this ‘enigmatic term’. Various translations of the Bible result in a tension between the sensual and intellectual realms in Kant’s understanding of ‘Gesinnung’. A review of the pre-Kantian history of the idea of ‘Gesinnung’ clarifies some problems. Important sources for the Kant’s concept were the writings of A. G. Baumgarten, Chr. A. Crusius, M. Mendelssohn, and J. J. Spalding. ‘Gesinnung’ obtains a conceptual status in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. However, Kant truly develops this concept only in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Here ‘Gesinnung’ appears as an unknowable, noumenal, supersensual basis for the acceptance of other maxims and as a maxim of maxims. Virtue turns out to be the evidence of the presence of ‘Gesinnung’ while an act is a manifestation of ‘Gesinnung’.