Kant's conception of conscience

This thesis provides a detailed exposition of Kant’s conception of conscience and the systematic role it plays in his mature moral philosophy. It argues that, even though Kant does not unfold a full theory of conscience, his different presentations centre around a common theme. Conscience is part of Kant’s answer to the question of how finite moral agents are able to live up to the commands of the moral law. Exploring the different functions Kant ascribes to conscience, therefore, provides a nuanced account of how the authority of the moral law manifests itself in the moral life of human agents. In part I (chapters 1–4), I argue that conscience is needed in the case of finite beings who experience the moral law as an imperative. As beings who do not always act as duty bids, they require conscience to remind them of the law’s unconditional ought and to view themselves as bearers of duties. In part II (chapters 5–8), I explore the extent to which conscience can guide the moral deliberations of agents whose epistemic access to the world is limited. In these chapters, I argue that conscience warns agents if they are about to violate the moral law because they act on judgements that are not sufficiently certain or lack the required justification. In part III (chapters 9–10), I explore Kant’s idea of conscience as an inner court. Finite moral agents are summoned before the inner court of conscience to judge, as impartially as they can, whether they have formed their resolutions to act in the light of the moral law. To be fully impartial with themselves, conscience requires finite moral agents to think of judging themselves as if they stood before a divine tribunal and had to answer to God for their deeds.