Regional Governance, Authority and Redistribution

This dissertation analyzes the determinants of income inequality and redistribution at the subnational level through a multilevel governance lens. It asks how, and under what circumstances, can subnational governments affect income inequality within their borders? I argue first that regional market (pre-tax and transfer) inequality is explained by labor market and demographic characteristics which vary subnationally; and that regional redistribution (reduction in inequality as a result of taxes and transfers) is a product primarily of partisan governance at the subnational level. Further, I argue that the effect of partisanship on regional inequality reduction is stronger when there is party alignment between the regional and national governments; when the region is relatively wealthier; and when politicians hold complementary mandates at multiple levels of government. This is especially the case in more centralized political contexts, where the fiscal relationships between levels of government are more informal.To provide empirical support for these arguments, I use a mixed methods approach. First, analyses of an original dataset of 2,799 region-years in 13 countries from 1990 to 2010 provide broad, cross-national evidence for this theoretical framework. Second, qualitative case evidence including 36 interviews with local, regional and national-level politicians from four regions in (centralized) France and four regions in (federal) Germany both corroborate these findings and lend additional depth.