When Reciprocity is not Enough : Explaining Anti-Social Outcomes via Intrinsic Personality Traits

Behavior and outcomes that do not fit to classical game theory are often observed and, hence, reported. Common explanations for that are, e.g., repeated games, reciprocity, costly punishment, and pure altruism. Via the prisoner's dilemma and costly punishment, we show that those explanations, esp. reciprocity, are not always able to account for outcomes that involve anti-social punishment, i.e., to punish someone after a successful cooperation. We demonstrate, however, that intrinsic motivations, including both altruism and spiteful preferences, additional to material payoffs can explain those outcomes. To capture the agents' intrinsic motivation we introduce a uniform notion of altruism and sadism, the so-called SEA model. Further, we present a Python code to find so-called (pure-strategy) SEA Nash equilibria. Conclusively, we illustrate the SEA model via simple, well-known games.

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Publication Details

Journal
EPub Bayreuth (University of Bayreuth)
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.15495/epub_ubt_00008501
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

When Reciprocity is not Enough : Explaining Anti-Social Outcomes via Intrinsic Personality Traits

EPub Bayreuth (University of Bayreuth)
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

When Reciprocity is not Enough : Explaining Anti-Social Outcomes via Intrinsic Personality Traits

article en

Abstract

Behavior and outcomes that do not fit to classical game theory are often observed and, hence, reported. Common explanations for that are, e.g., repeated games, reciprocity, costly punishment, and pure altruism. Via the prisoner's dilemma and costly punishment, we show that those explanations, esp. reciprocity, are not always able to account for outcomes that involve anti-social punishment, i.e., to punish someone after a successful cooperation. We demonstrate, however, that intrinsic motivations, including both altruism and spiteful preferences, additional to material payoffs can explain those outcomes. To capture the agents' intrinsic motivation we introduce a uniform notion of altruism and sadism, the so-called SEA model. Further, we present a Python code to find so-called (pure-strategy) SEA Nash equilibria. Conclusively, we illustrate the SEA model via simple, well-known games.

EPub Bayreuth (University of Bayreuth)
University of Bayreuth (DE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 42%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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