From the infinite to the finite and various : on motion, Spinoza, and his (meta)physics

Spinoza’s monistic ontology famously consists of only one substance (God) and requires that all other things, including me, my desk, Mars, my dog, New York City, the sun, your idea of justice, and everything else, are God’s modes. This framework gives rise to two most basic problems. First, the problem of the finite: given that Spinoza’s God is absolutely infinite, there is a logical gap to be bridged to explain God’s having finite modes. Second, the problem of variety: Spinoza is interested in providing a sufficient explanation for reality’s structure, so he is incapable of admitting facts into his system without explanations. The many finite modes appear to be qualitatively heterogeneous, which may not admit of explanation, given God’s unity. Many consider these problems insurmountable. In this thesis, I propose reaching into Spinoza’s scant physics as a method for solving them. I explore Spinoza’s understanding of concepts like motion, collision, vacuum, and laws of nature, in order to clarify his metaphysics. In Chapter 1, I outline the problems and explain that past attempted solutions require denial of basic Spinozistic commitments. In Chapter 2, I explore Cartesian mechanism and influences on Spinoza in order to develop a solution to the problem of variety on the basis of Spinoza’s understanding of oblique collision. In Chapters 3 and 4, I develop Spinoza’s conceptions of motion and the laws of nature to solve the problem of the finite. In Chapter 5, I explore the implications of these solutions for Spinoza’s understanding of the bottom of the material mereological ladder. In Chapter 6, I amend the standard reading of Spinoza’s conception of the universe considered as mereological totality. In Chapter 7, I explain how my reading of Spinoza on the laws of nature and the vacuum can clarify and develop his necessitarianism.