Risk aversion can promote cooperation

Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma games with an arbitrary number of players by combining reaction networks, methods from quantum mechanics applied to stochastic complex systems, game theory and stochastic simulations of molecular reactions. Using this framework, we propose a novel and robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion that leads to cooperative behaviour in population games. Rather than individuals seeking to maximise payouts in the long run, individuals seek to obtain a minimum set of resources with a given level of confidence and in a limited time span. We show that this mechanism can lead to the emergence of new equilibria in a range of social dilemma games.

Publication Details

Journal
Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin)
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.17169/refubium-46645
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Risk aversion can promote cooperation

Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin)
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Risk aversion can promote cooperation

article en

Abstract

Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma games with an arbitrary number of players by combining reaction networks, methods from quantum mechanics applied to stochastic complex systems, game theory and stochastic simulations of molecular reactions. Using this framework, we propose a novel and robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion that leads to cooperative behaviour in population games. Rather than individuals seeking to maximise payouts in the long run, individuals seek to obtain a minimum set of resources with a given level of confidence and in a limited time span. We show that this mechanism can lead to the emergence of new equilibria in a range of social dilemma games.

Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin)
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Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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Risk aversion can promote cooperation · Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS