Evolutionary Game Analysis for Government Supervision of Green Electricity Certificate in a Renewable Energy Power Supply Chain with Portfolio Standard

Green certificate is an important measure to solve the consumption problem of the renewable energies such as photovoltaic and wind power. However, the applicants of green certificate may engage in "cheating" behaviors. This paper explores the evolutionary game for green certificate application and government regulation of all parties in the renewable energy power supply chain by combining the renewable portfolio standard and green certificate. Firstly, from the short-term perspective, a study is made on the renewable energy consumption problem of the renewable energy power supply chain composed of power generation enterprises and power grid companies. And then, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed among the power generation enterprise, power grid company and the National Energy Administration from a long-term perspective, and the dynamic evolution process and the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite strategies are analyzed. Finally, the research conclusions are verified through simulation analysis. The results show that increasing the penalty coefficient will impel power generation enterprise and power grid company to choose "honesty" strategy, and reducing the return coefficient of green certificate income can encourage power grid company to choose "honesty" strategy; relatively high spillover benefits and relatively low strict regulatory costs are conducive to the formation of a healthy green certificate market operation mechanism.