Why not everyone can afford to be a bullshitter: How epistemic injustices also permeate bullshit

Abstract Although bullshit has gained significant attention in philosophy, there remains a lack of consensus regarding its characterization. I contend that a feminist approach could provide valuable insights into this issue. Bullshit is commonly characterized by its indifference toward truth, distinguished from lying. I posit that this indifference can be interpreted as an indifference toward the responsibility one's utterances entail. According to Frankfurt (2005), bullshitters often enjoy greater tolerance than liars. I argue that this tolerance enables speakers to engage in careless discourse. However, by analyzing various examples of bullshit, I show that this tolerance is heavily influenced by social and identity factors that shape our evaluation of speakers. By focusing on these factors, we can gain a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics of bullshit, as well as recognize parallels between these dynamics and those associated with epistemic injustices.