Credit coguarantee revenue-sharing contract coordinating supply chains with the EB platform

With the increasing prevalence of online marketplaces, revenue-sharing contracts have been widely adopted on electronic business (EB) platforms. Due to various risk factors, EB platforms often face insufficient guarantee capacity. To address this challenge, we formulate a multi-level Stackelberg game, and propose a credit coguarantee revenue-sharing (CRS) contract to examine the factors influencing the equilibrium decisions of supply chain participants. We find that increasing the revenue-sharing rate can enhance the decentralised optimal order quantity within a specific range, whereas exceeding this range leads to the opposite effect. The results demonstrate that the CRS contract with an appropriate revenue-sharing rate can achieve coordination. A comparative analysis further reveals that, without credit coguarantee and risk compensation measures, the EB platform is compelled to allocate a larger share of profits to the seller in order to realise coordination. This study provides theoretical support for managers in making optimal decisions when utilising CRS contracts.