Clan, State, and Squeeze: Corruption and fragility in Somalia

Corruption is a major impediment to governance, development, and stability, particularly in fragile states. In Somalia, it is deeply embedded within political, economic, and social structures, sustained by weak state institutions and clan-based social norms. This paper examines the nexus between systemic state fragility and clan allegiances in perpetuating corruption, arguing that their interaction creates a self-reinforcing cycle that undermines institutional reform. Drawing on qualitative methods, including a desk review of literature, policy reports, and government documents, as well as informal discussions with key informants, the study traces the evolution of corruption from post-independence bureaucratic inefficiencies to a deeply entrenched system of patronage, rent-seeking, and donor-driven misgovernance. It highlights how social norms, such as hiil iyo hoo – the obligation to support one’s clan – exacerbate nepotism and obstruct accountability. Additionally, it explores how political interference, weak legal frameworks, and ineffective oversight mechanisms have facilitated systemic corruption, eroding public trust and state legitimacy. This paper contributes to the broader discourse on governance reform in fragile states by contextualizing corruption within Somalia’s historical and socio-political landscape.<br>