Quiet offence, passive defence? Interest groups, lobbying strategies, and agenda-setting influence

This article examines how interest groups, whether defending the status quo or advocating for change, can influence the policy agenda. It argues that increasing inside lobbying allows interest groups to push their ‘dream’ issues onto the agenda, whereas remaining passive is the most effective way to prevent ‘nightmares’ from attaining agenda status. Analysing the preferences of 138 interest groups on 53 EU policy issues, the study reveals that status quo challengers who intensify their inside lobbying efforts gain a competitive advantage in agenda-setting, while increased outside lobbying offers them no benefits. Conversely, status quo defenders gain little from inside lobbying and risk losing by investing in outside lobbying. The effectiveness of passivity is surprising because it contradicts the conventional wisdom that active lobbying is crucial for securing influence. Overall, this article contributes to a better understanding of interest groups’ political influence and agenda-setting dynamics.