Critiques of Mises' Praxeology

This article offers an critique of Ludwig von Mises' praxeology, examining its epistemological and methodological foundations from various perspectives. It analyzes the deductive structure of Human Action, where from the a priori axiom “man acts” economic laws are deduced without recourse to empirical verification. This raises serious questions regarding its falsifiability and adaptability to the modern scientific method. Through formal logical formulations and dialogue with the criticisms stemming from Lakatos’s Methodological Program, as well as perspectives from Quine, Putnam, Kant, and Mario Bunge—and taking into account contributions from behavioral economics—it is shown that, despite its internal coherence, praxeology suffers from a dogmatic and closed nature that limits its explanatory capacity in the face of the complexity of social phenomena. Consequently, it is concluded that the exclusion of empirical revision and the reduction of human action to a tautology of rationality place Mises’ praxeology outside the contemporary scientific paradigm.