階級分析的隱沒:試論台灣政治經濟學討論之一側面

The Eclipse of Class Analysis in Taiwanese Political Economy Discourse Since the introduction of Marxism from Western Europe into Russia and East Asia, the question of how to integrate Marxism with local practices has become a central concern for Marxists across different regions. In European Marxist theory, the revolutionary driving force is fundamentally presumed to be the working class. However, since the working class constituted a minority in societies like Russia and East Asia, Marxists in various countries sought different ways to identify potential revolutionary driving forces beyond the proletariat, with the goal of forging a united front between the working class and these other revolutionary classes. What is referred to as “class analysis” arose precisely to determine which classes might participate in revolution and which could be included in a united front. The revolutionary forces beyond the proletariat initially referred to the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and later to the so-called “national bourgeoisie” or “liberal bourgeoisie.” This paper examines the eclipse of class analysis, referring to various situations in which the effort to justify a cross-class united front leads to the absence, invalidation, formalization, or even the hollowing out of class analysis. The primary focus of this paper is political-economic discourse centered on the Taiwanese revolution (台灣革命). It argues that, due to Taiwan’s experience of repression under Japanese colonial rule and later under the Kuomintang’s prolonged White Terror, most Taiwanese socialists believed that revolution in Taiwan must be based on a united front. However, it was precisely in attempting to justify the necessity of this united front that class analysis was hollowed out—reduced to a mere annotation of a preordained conclusion, namely the necessity of the united front. In addition, the development of capitalist modes of production in Taiwan from scratch during the twentieth century was interrupted by multiple regime changes and social upheavals, which led Marxists to arrive at divergent assessments regarding the prospects for capitalism in Taiwan. When coupled with differing analytical methods, these divergent views made class analysis increasingly subjective and, as a result, practically ineffective. This paper does not focus on the Communist Party of Taiwan(台灣共產黨) during the Japanese colonial period or on the Taiwan Provincial Work Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (中國共產黨台灣省工作委員會) after the Taiwan Retrocession (台灣光復). These organizations were under the organizational framework and theoretical authority of the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party, respectively; therefore, their class analyses must be understood within broader organizational contexts and cannot be analyzed in isolation. As such, the core subject of this paper is the theoretical developments after the rupture of these organizational and theoretical structures brought about by the Chinese Civil War and the international Cold War—that is, theoretical developments after 1949. The first type of eclipse of class analysis in Taiwan relates to the island’s primitive accumulation of capital (原始積累). After 1949, primitive accumulation was carried out on a large scale, and the trend toward the capitalization of Taiwanese society became increasingly apparent. However, because the Kuomintang (國民黨) regime was widely perceived by Taiwanese socialists of the time as a state apparatus transplanted from China’s semi-feudal society (半封建社會), a prevailing mode of thought emerged. First, the Kuomintang regime was seen as a reactionary and brutal semi-feudal regime (半封建政權), making its overthrow a revolutionary slogan that could rally a cross-class united front. Second, as Taiwanese society was becoming increasingly capitalist, a critical question arose: could the emerging native Taiwanese bourgeoisie participate in the movement to overthrow the Kuomintang? For example, Liu Shinkei (劉進慶), a professor living in Japan, argued that this emerging native bourgeoisie was integrated with the Kuomintang regime and shared its oppressive nature. In contrast, Su Beng (史明), a separatist leftist also based in Japan, asserted that there existed a national contradiction (民族矛盾) between the native bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang, thus making the former a potential revolutionary force. Meanwhile, the North American journal Taiwan Jinmin (《台灣人民》) held that the native bourgeoisie was dual in nature—both reactionary and revolutionary. Clearly, among Liu Shinkei, Su Beng, and Taiwan Jinmin, it is Su Beng’s class analysis that most risks eclipse, as he overemphasized the revolutionary potential of the native bourgeoisie (本省籍資產階級), basing his argument on a subjectively imagined national contradiction (民族矛盾). The second type of eclipse of class analysis in Taiwan concerns the phenomenon of capital monopoly. This issue began attracting attention within Taiwan’s socialist movement in the late 1970s. A view emerged during that time which argued that, due to the shift among Taiwanese private capital from free competition to concentration and eventually monopoly, a sharp contradiction had arisen between private monopolistic capital (民間壟斷資本) and non-monopolistic private capital (民間非壟斷資本) —that is, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Since most discussions at the time assumed a close relationship between private monopolistic capital and the Kuomintang regime, the contradiction between monopolistic and non-monopolistic private capital became a central concern for Marxists. In other words, the discussion once again revolved around whether the bourgeoisie could be revolutionary. But the problem was no longer simply whether the native bourgeoisie had revolutionary potential; it had shifted to the question of whether the broader sector of non-monopolistic private capital, represented by SMEs, could become a revolutionary driving force in the struggle against the Kuomintang regime, and whether slogans such as “anti-monopoly” could help mobilize these SMEs and forge a united front. After the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨) in September 1986, various perspectives emerged around the issue of “anti-monopoly.” Some believed that the DPP was a product of SMEs reacting to the economic crisis; others argued that the DPP should take on the mission of building an anti-monopoly alliance; and still others suggested that such an alliance should be formed independently outside of the DPP. A particularly significant exchange took place in the course of this development of the anti-monopoly alliance theory. One side was represented by Tsai Chienjen (蔡健仁), an overseas socialist advocating for an anti-monopoly alliance; the other side was Lin Shuyang (林書揚), a Taiwan-based socialist who supported a worker–peasant alliance. In the early 1980s, Tsai Chienjen served as editor of the North American publication Taiwan Tide (《台灣思潮》), which maintained continuity with the overseas socialist movement represented by Hsu Tengyuan (許登源) and others associated with Taiwan Jinmin. Lin Shuyang, on the other hand, was the longest-imprisoned political dissident in Taiwan: arrested in 1950 and not released until 1984, he spent thirty-four years and seven months behind bars. After his release, Lin became a leading figure of the Taiwan-based socialist-reunificationists, represented by the journal China Tide (《夏潮》). The exchange between Tsai Chienjen and Lin Shuyang occurred in October 1986, one month after the founding of the DPP. It was not a face-to-face conversation but rather an exchange of letters. Currently, only two articles remain from this debate: Tsai Chienjen’s “On the Anti-Monopoly Alliance and Its Core Principles” and Lin Shuyang’s response, “Some Comments on the Anti-Monopoly Alliance.” Their debate centered on three issues: first, how to understand the class character of the DPP; second, whether SMEs could serve as a revolutionary driving force; and third, how to address the unification–independence issue. Tsai Chienjen argued that the DPP was part of the monopoly system and thus a target of revolution, but that SMEs could be won over. Therefore, he advocated using “anti-monopoly” as a rallying slogan—defining allies through opposition—and thereby constructing a united front akin to a popular front. In this context, he believed that “left-wing Taiwan independence supporters” who sympathized with SMEs and promoted class collaboration could also be incorporated. Lin Shuyang, by contrast, did not view the DPP as part of the monopoly system but rather as a representative of SMEs, which he characterized as inherently dual in nature. Consequently, Lin did not believe a united front could rely on the participation of SMEs. Instead, he argued that the movement should be rooted in the two fundamental classes of workers and peasants, forming a worker–peasant alliance. Additionally, Lin criticized the anti-monopoly alliance theory for neglecting what he described as the “binding force of a new Chinese nationalism with socialist content,” and for underestimating the potential for dual identification—both class and national—among the Taiwanese people. He denounced the anti-monopoly alliance theory as a form of “individualistic voluntarism” that focused solely on the internal political dynamics of the island. Accordingly, he argued that left-wing Taiwan independence supporters need not be courted. Rather, he proposed forming a people’s patriotic united front with the worker–peasant alliance at its core. Although Lin did not reject the idea of using the anti-monopoly alliance as a preparatory stage for the people’s patriotic united front, he also pointed out that the two united front theories faced fundamental difficulties in reconciling with one another. According to currently available sources, the written dialogue between Tsai Chienjen and Lin Shuyang did not continue further. However, beginning in 1987, two