Is Manoeuvre Warfare The First Casualty Of The War In Ukraine?

The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed major technological and doctrinal implications. Among these, the big question that arises is whether the manoeuvrist approach, which is one of the cornerstones of current NATO doctrine, is still relevant and practicable in current and future conflicts. The most evident trend is how, for the most part, the ground operations in Ukraine are more similar to the well-known model of attritional warfare rather than the much more celebrated and positively regarded one of manoeuvre warfare. Extensive references to examples drawn from military history and the legacy of Soviet strategic thought and its main theorists contribute to better delineating the exact nature and mutual interactions between these two above-mentioned concepts. The conclusion can be drawn that a series of factors, especially related to technology and the capabilities of the means employed, have led to a general superiority of defence over the attack, in what one can dare to define as a new "1914 syndrome". This is analogous to what happened in the early stages of the First World War on the Western Front when this phenomenon led directly to the stalemate of trench warfare for the following four years. At present, we must have the intellectual honesty to admit that we are not yet able to formulate proposals or identify solutions to continue to propose the application of the manoeuvre approach, assuming that it still proves to be practically feasible. To truly set up a necessary doctrinal development, we will have to wait for the end of the conflict in Ukraine and have truly in-depth analyses, based on consolidated data and ascertained facts, available.