From Resistance to Proxies: The Making of the Mujahideen in Cold War Afghanistan

This article examines the historical trajectory and enduring consequences of U.S. and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, with a focus on the covert dynamics of Operation Cyclone (1979–1989). It explores how Afghanistan became the epicenter of Cold War proxy warfare, engineered by the CIA, Pakistan's ISI, and Saudi intelligence, resulting in the arming and ideological empowerment of militant Islamist factions. The study delves into the evolution of the Mujahideen from rural resistance fighters to transnational jihadist actors, highlighting the role of figures such as Gust Avrakotos, Charlie Wilson, and Osama bin Laden. It situates these developments within a broader geopolitical framework, including the Soviet invasion’s controversial origins, the CIA's use of deniable assets, and the long-term blowback of these policies. Drawing on intelligence declassifications, historical research, and policy documents such as the PNAC's “Rebuilding America’s Defenses,” the paper argues that the strategic choices made during the Cold War set the stage for decades of instability, culminating in the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It concludes by underscoring the dangers of interventionist doctrines based on proxy warfare and unaccountable intelligence operations.