The Debate about European Intelligence

The debate about a fully-fledged European Intelligence Service is already going on for two decades and is dominated by two positions. The main argument for a fully-fledged European Intelligence are new threats: first terrorism, then cyber threats, hybrid warfare and now the Ukraine war. Also, it is doubted that the member states alone are still strong enough and argued that the member states’ intelligence may be too fragmented for an effective cooperation. The main argument against a European Intelligence Service is that the national security is a core element of national sovereignty which should be kept. Further arguments were raised with regard to the different concepts, structures, and legal settings of the national intelligence communities. In the EU Strategic Compass 2022 it was discussed that the European Intelligence needs to be consolidated and strengthened. In line with this, the Niinistö Report from 2024 recommends “to strengthen EU Intelligence Structures step-by-step towards to a fully-fledged EU Service for Intelligence Cooperation […] to ensure the EU’s capacity to take autonomous and decisive action”. The proposed solution is to have a complementary Intelligence Service that respects the prerogative of national security. However, the Niinistö Report leaves no doubt that this agency should be fully-fledged in the long run, i.e., not only a simple coordination platform. Behind the EU Intelligence Debate, there is the unresolved question of the ultimate goal of European integration: should it finally result in a state or state-like entity or should it be a close cooperation of national states with red lines for integration such as national security. Currently, the EU integration is moving forward with integration steps in multiple policy areas which leaves both options (state-like entity or cooperation) open. The EU tries to solve the problem by arguing that the EU has a unique role in security and therefore specific needs for more autonomy in security and intelligence matters. The capabilities should be set up complementary, i.e., they should not replace the national agencies; but an additional European agency could add value. While there are ongoing centralization efforts in the cyber sector, no further major change could be observed since 2022, which may indicate that the member states still need to be convinced. This paper analyzes the debate in detail. After an introduction in the structure and logic of intelligence cooperation, the development of European Union is briefly presented. Afterwards, it is shown how the main European intelligence units INTCEN, EUMS.INT and SIAC are embedded into the Common Security and Defense Policy CSDP and the European External Action Service EEAS. Thereafter, the fragmented cyber sector and the centralization efforts are analyzed. Based on this, the main arguments in the European Intelligence debate are presented.