Security Conditionality: Evidence and Effectiveness

Conditionality, the practice of attaching conditions to aid, loans, or grant assistance, has become a ubiquitous feature of security assistance. Conditionality is predicted on its deterrent or motivational effects with the ultimate goal being to incentivize and influence the behavior of recipient countries to align with the strategic interests and values of the provider country. While lauded for its potential to promote reforms and good governance, conditionality has also been criticized for its intrusiveness, ineffectiveness, and potential to undermine national sovereignty. This paper argues that security conditionality in the emerging multiplex system will have no influence on recipient behavior. Middle and small power countries, those who should be most susceptible to conditionality, will seek less burdensome security guarantees thus aligning themselves with other great powers. This paper examines three theoretical constructs and tests conditionality using case studies based on Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Far from aligning recipients with donor countries’ strategic interest, this could contribute to change in the international system.