Intellectual virtue and cognitive determinism: a critique to neuroliberal rationality

<p>Neuroliberalism is a mode of governance that deliberately shapes human be-havior in free societies by utilizing behavioral, psychological, and neurological knowledge. Although this approach to psychological governance has gained strength in recent decades, it is founded on a pessimistic view of human ratio-nality, whose conceptual core is cognitive determinism, a thesis that posits the inevitable tendency to mistake in people’s decisions, due to human cognitive nature. My goal in this paper is to articulate an alternative view of human intel-lectual nature to that proposed by neuroliberalism, based on an approach centered on intellectual virtue. I argue that intellectual virtues are essential traits to constitute a form of relational rationality, far from the extremes represented by the views of neoclassical economics (homo economicus) and neuroliberalism (homo psychologicus), since human beings can work to cultivate qualities that enable them to cooperate in the attainment of knowledge and informed deci-sion making, and not resign themselves to a form of governance that distrusts people’s intellectual agency, autonomy, reflexivity, as well as their capacity to take responsibility for gaining knowledge and making decisions about sub-stantial aspects of their lives</p>