Freedom and the formalization of experience: a Hegelian critique, a Kantian answer

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s critique of Immanuel Kant’s formalism is highly informative – it brings to light many aspects of morality and ethical decision-making that had gone entirely unnoticed by Kantians until that point, such as the importance of world history in determining our concepts of right, and that the subsumption of particulars under universals does not typically fall to individuals. Because a determination of moral concepts by history itself seems to contradict Kantian morality (in which we use the categorical imperative to determine whether a formulated maxim conforms with duty or not) by eliminating any genuine choice (as the ways in which we formulate our maxims are themselves historical products rather than free decisions), Kantians have responded to Hegel’s critique in part by trying to show that such factors can be accounted for purely within Kantian philosophy. Through examining Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism and Kantian philosophy, this thesis will follow this tradition. I will argue that Hegel’s critique must transform how we conceptualize Kant’s philosophy, how we should think of his doctrine of freedom in contrast to determinism, and the sense of objectivity that we can secure with his philosophy. I will argue that the best answer to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism is Kant’s own theory of the end of nature and history and that his writings on history are consistent with the rest of his more speculative work.