A Historical Analysis of Japan’s Taiwan Policy: Japan’s Convergence with and Divergence from the United States on Taiwan since World War II

This paper examines the historical transition of Japan’s Taiwan policy, emphasizing moments of convergence and divergence with U.S. foreign policy. Initially, after World War II, Japan’s decisions on Taiwan were made under significant American influence. This was evident in 1952 when Japan signed the Japan-Republic of China (ROC) Peace Treaty, largely to align with U.S. Cold War objectives and avoid legitimizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), America’s adversary during the Korean War. In the years following, Japanese administrations like those of Hatoyama and Kishi pursued foreign policies that sought a more autonomous path, trying to adjust the bilateral relationship with the United States. However, U.S. pressure persisted, particularly in security matters. The 1969 Sato-Nixon Summit Meeting was also a prominent example of Japan’s compromising with the U.S. on Taiwan issues. As a trade-off of the non-nuclear basis reversion of Okinawa, Japan had to compromise and give the U.S. political assurance that Japan would not deny U.S. use of force in bases during the prior consultation with regard to contingencies on the Korean peninsula. In addition, Japan made a more significant commitment to support the U.S. security system in a broadened regional scope, including Taiwan, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia. However, this trajectory shifted in 1972 with President Nixon’s surprise visit to China. The “Nixon Shock” not only alienated Japan diplomatically but also opened political space for Japan to independently normalize relations with the PRC. Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC, which preceded the U.S. by seven years, was the first clear divergence from American foreign policy in the postwar era. The late 1990s marked another shift. The PRC’s rise, highlighted by the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, led Japan to reassess its regional security priorities. While still closely aligned with the U.S., Japan began to consider the PRC’s reactions to its Taiwan-related policies. The visit of Jiang Zemin to Japan underscored this new balancing act, as Japan adopted a more ambiguous position on Taiwan to manage both U.S. alliance expectations and PRC sensitivities. In the 21st century, this policy of strategic ambiguity has become more pronounced. Under the pressures of renewed U.S.-China competition, particularly after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, Japan has sought to align with U.S. security objectives while avoiding open antagonism with China. This was exemplified in Prime Minister Suga’s cautious language during the 2021 summit meeting with President Biden. In conclusion, Japan’s Taiwan policy has evolved from U.S.-dominated decisions to a delicate balancing act between U.S. alliance commitments and the realities of a rising PRC. Today, Japan continues to maintain a strategically ambiguous posture to preserve regional stability while safeguarding its national interests.