Can Czech senators advocate constituency interests without the formal power to do so?

Our study aims to enrich the existing literature on bicameralism and territorial representation, which traditionally associates territorial representation in upper chambers with federations or heterogeneous, decentralised states. Despite this accepted view, territorial interests may also be promoted by the upper chambers of small unitary countries. In our case study of Czech bicameralism, we examine (1) whether an upper chamber can advocate the interests of territories even in a relatively small and centralised country without significant minorities, and (2) more importantly, how members of an upper chamber can do so when they lack the formal powers for such a role. Using content analysis of semi-structured interviews with senators, we found that some senators did adopt the unintended role of territorial representation. They primarily used their influence in informal processes, however, they also used some formal powers not originally designed to promote the interests of constituencies/territories, such as drafting annexes to bills. Thus, our findings demonstrate the possibility of the spontaneous development of upper chambers and the exercise of an unintended role even without possessing formal powers.