OVER-DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION IN KANT'S ETHICAL PJILOSOPHY: CASE OF IMPERFECT AND PERFECT DUTIES

In this contribution we will discuss the demandingness objection with regard to Kant’s ethics. While in the literature there has been an emphasis on this issue with regard to imperfect duties, our main goal is to show Kantian ethics has resources to resort to in the case of the demandingness objection in the class of perfect duties. For doing this, first we will discuss the inherent difference between imperfect and perfect duties while the duty of rescuing being a case in-between the two classes of duties through linguistic proof. Furthermore, we consider different possible components of a moral theory, introduced by Scheffler, which can lead to demandingness: (i) a required process of decision making, (ii) overridingness and (iii) the stringent content of demands. While we concur with Kantian critics that the stringent content of Kantian ethics may be a source of demandingness, we will show that Kantian ethics has resources to respond to demandingness arisen from other components. For this purpose we discuss Kant’s notion of “Vorsatz” (intention), accompanied by the device of Flouting, introduced by Grice in his Conversational Implicatures.