Mapping Coordination Dynamics in Offline Real Estate Crowdfunding: Insights from Multiple Correspondence Analysis

This paper focuses on the quantified qualitative dimension of a sequential mixed-methods study investigating coordination mechanisms in offline real estate crowdfunding. Building on prior qualitative insights (identifying themes such as common interest, voluntary commitment, and cross-anticipation), we analyze data from a closed questionnaire administered to 31 participants (snowball sampling), structured around 24 variables (114 modalities). Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), we identified four distinct participant profiles: (1) Experts (experienced, risk-averse, aligning with leaders’ interests), (2) Empaths (empathy-driven, professionally linked), (3) Free Riders (indifferent, distrustful property owners), and (4) Losers (high-risk takers facing project failure). MCA revealed that coordination in this context relies on social conventions (salience and precedent) rather than price mechanisms or coercive rules. Bounded rationality and interdependencies among participants—often overlooked in neoclassical frameworks—drive reliance on infinite cross-anticipation and voluntary engagement. Hierarchical coordination fails in multi-Nash equilibrium scenarios, while mutual gains emerge through focal points and shared norms (e.g., fear of exclusion). Notably, distrust in leaders’ perceived self-interest and participants’ heterogeneous risk appetites critically shape outcomes. This quantified phase underscores the limitations of traditional firm theory in explaining offline crowdfunding dynamics. Instead, socially embedded conventions and strategic communication through actions (“strategic moves”) prove pivotal. The findings offer practical insights for managing heterogeneous groups in collective projects, emphasizing trust-building and adaptive governance. By isolating the quantitative-qualitative layer, this study advances methodological rigor in analyzing coordination under bounded rationality.