Rule Following: A Criterion for Wittgenstein's meaning as Use Theory

Since the publication of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language by Saul Kripke, there have been controversial interpretations of what it means by ‘rule following’ with regard to the question of meaning. Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following demands us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. This boils down, according to Kripke, to the conclusion that either of the choice ends up with a dilemma which calls for a solution yet again to yield another sceptical solution. Rivals to Kripke like McDowell and Wright have argued that if we seriously read Wittgenstein we realise that a dispositional choice is plausible. Others like Patrizio Lo Presti, for example, have defended Wittgenstein by positing that there is no need to separate mental and behvioral items in the first place and that Wittgenstein is misinterpreted. Following this line of thinking, this paper contends that rule following is an essential criteria for Wittgenstein theory of meaning as use. It takes the view that if the paradox forces us to make a choice then it is plausible to choose behavioral items as satisfying rule following and so meaning. The paper thus adopts the position that, when discussing the concept of language game to the conclusion that the meaning of a word is but its use, Wittgenstein successfully uses the concept of rule following to reach this conclusion. Simply, meaning as use is realized when people follow the rules of language. They are neither written rules nor syntactical rules but semantic rules of language based on context. Thus, in our daily conversations and practical life humans tend to follow rules, sometimes without being familiar with that, to successfully understand each other and take actions on various issues at hand. This begins right from the moment we learn language.