A Critical Evaluation of the Political Dynamics of the Ethiopian Eritrean Relations from1993 -2024: Security Implications for the Greater Horn & Sahel Regions

After a protracted conflict between 1960s and 1993, Eritrea finally won the independence referendum and eventually split from Ethiopia. From 1993 to 2018, Eritrea remained one of Ethiopia’s troubling security challenges in foreign policy endeavors. Unlike other neighbors within the Greater Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea have had a complex relationship, that is, of unity and separation; war and peace; hate and love; cooperation and competition. However, in 2018, a historic peace deal was signed between the two states where they pledged to ‘bury their past’ and bring in a new dawn to their relations. However, recent developments in Ethiopia, by default, have recognized Somaliland as signing a port access treaty with it ignited fresh tensions with Eritrea. Ethiopia’s ambition to have port access to the Red Sea at any cost is a concern because it has bypassed Somalia and signed a port treaty with a territory that Somalia considered to be under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, Somaliland is not recognized as a state by key organizations such as the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the Arab League. Therefore, such a brazen move (of disregarding the sovereignty of Somalia) has, - understandably, - increased Eritrea’s suspicion that there might be more ominous political motives at play than meets the eye. Consequently, Eritrea, Somalia, and Egypt have been band wagoned by signing an agreement that accentuates the right to protect the sovereignty of neighbors. Therefore, this tripartite treaty works as a form of hedging or buffer against an increasingly assertive Ethiopia. While a full-scale conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is unlikely, the implications of their weakening relations could cause considerable spillover security effects beyond the region. These security challenges could potentially create an opportune environment for various rebel groups, including jihadists, to reassert themselves. For instance, the current conflict in Sudan, where two rival army factions are jostling for power, implies that both camps are soliciting and receiving support from various interested actors within and outside the region. This situation provides an avenue for potential proxy wars to ensue because volatile environments only work to strengthen rebel networks, as dissidents thrive mainly in weak and conflict-ridden states. In the current Ethiopian Eritrean standoff, the Sudanese crisis is a significant variable to consider because Sudan is surrounded by prime arms-trafficking Sahel hubs, where weapons are smuggled through Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Thus, the fundamental goal of this study is to critically analyze (especially) post 2018 Ethiopian- Eritrean relations and gauge their tenability through a neoclassical realism theoretical lens. The findings suggest that due to competing interests by various domestic, regional and international actors in the Horn of Africa, coupled with the covert activities of rebel factions in the Sahel, Ethiopian Eritrean relations will continue to be precarious and may only be regulated by the balance of power politics. Data for this study were gathered through content analysis, digital ethnography, and other online sources.