Large players, information and coordination

In this dissertation, I analyze how large players in financial markets exert influence on smaller players and how this affects the decisions of the large ones. I focus on how the large players process information in an uncertain environment, form expectations and communicate these to smaller players through their actions. I examine these relationships empirically in the foreign exchange market and in the context of a game-theoretic model of an investment project. In Chapter 2, I investigate the relationship between the foreign exchange trading activity of large US-based market participants and the volatility of the nominal spot exchange rate. Using a novel dataset, I utilize the weekly growth rate of aggregate foreign currency positions of major market participants to proxy trading activity in the foreign exchange market. By estimating the heterogeneous autoregressive model of realized volatility (HAR-RV), I find evidence of a positive relationship between trading activity and volatility, which is mainly driven by unexpected changes in trading activity and is asymmetric for some of the currencies considered. My results contribute to the understanding of the drivers of exchange rate volatility and the role of large players in the flow of information in financial markets. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider a sequential global game of an investment project to examine how a large creditor influences the decisions of small creditors with her lending decision. I pay particular attention to the timing of the large player’s decision, i.e. whether she makes her decision to roll over a credit before or after the small players. I show that she faces a trade-off between signaling to and learning from small creditors. By being a focal point for coordination, her actions have a substantial impact on the probability of coordination failure and the failure of the investment project. I investigate the sensitivity of the equilibrium by comparing settings with perfect and imperfect learning. The results highlight the importance of signaling and provide a new perspective on the idea of catalytic finance and the influence of a lender-of-last-resort in self-fulfilling debt crises.