Strategy, Reputation, and Fighting in the Periphery

Why do great powers engage in conflicts in regions of limited intrinsic and strategic importance, often at the expense of their vital interests? This dissertation develops a strategic reputational theory to explain why great powers fight in the periphery. The central argument is that great powers anticipating particularly high costs of war – or having what I call cost-absorbent strategic thinking – experience heightened reputational concerns and are therefore more likely to engage in peripheral conflicts. The theory offers a new conceptualization of reputational motives grounded in strategic logic rather than cultural norms or irrational fears of credibility loss. To test the argument, I examine two pivotal cases of twentieth-century great power peripheral belligerence – the United States’ intervention in Vietnam (1965) and Japan’s invasion of China (1937). Despite occurring in vastly different historical contexts, both cases reveal that decision-makers operated under a common strategic environment characterized by cost-absorbent strategic thinking vis-à-vis their primary adversary. This condition intensified reputational concerns and drove the decision to fight in the periphery. Conversely, when such thinking was absent, reputational concerns were less pronounced and restraint prevailed. This dissertation contributes to broader theoretical debates in international relations on military strategy, technology, reputation, and great power competition. It also engages enduring foreign policy discourses on credibility, strategic restraint, and deterrence.