What Can Explain the Temporal Asymmetry of Moral Responsibility?

It is common sense that, while we can be morally responsible for our past actions, we cannot be morally responsible for our future actions. Why? Because they have not been performed yet. Ordinary morality, accordingly, is committed to a temporally grounded asymmetry with respect to moral responsibility. Call this idea ASYMMETRY. While it seems obvious to most that ASYMMETRY is true, little ink has been spilled on why it is true. In this paper, I will examine several natural candidates of potential explanations of ASYMMETRY. I will first consider the view that the past but not the future is determinate. I will then turn to commonly proposed conditions under which an agent acquires responsibility for an action at a time and conditions under which an agent retains responsibility over time. As I will argue, none of them can adequately explain ASYMMETRY.