Atomic Apostates: Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Dilemma of Massive Retaliation, 1953-1957

Faith in nuclear weapons as a security solution in the 1950s was controversial in the U.S. military, but not simply for reasons such as budget envy or service rivalry. Beneath the surface of national policy and the culture of the bomb, a shift in military thinking took place during Eisenhower’s first term. As “limited” crises spiked around the world after the Korean War, the joint chiefs of staff grew doubtful that long-range bombers and nuclear plenty could deter or resolve smaller wars. This uncertainty was prevalent across the services, not just within the army. Eisenhower’s first term did not represent an expansion of the atomic faith, but rather the initial phases of its contraction due to friction between national strategy and military objectives. This process of attenuation linked joint capabilities to national strategy in ways that defined the application of military power throughout the Cold War once nuclear battlefields failed to appear.