A nonstandard re-evaluation of Lewisian metaphysics for the material world

This Thesis is an attempt to look at the nature of the material world and some of the riddles that trouble our understanding of it from a broadly nonstandard -- or heterodox if you like -- Lewisian point of view. That is, theoretical tools out of the usual Lewisian box are employed to further a Lewisian agenda in the metaphysics of material objects. In Chapter 1, a new theory of Universalism based on a theory of natural objects will be systematically presented and discussed. In Chapter 2, the cause of Permissivism in metaphysics will be defended against new threats from defenders of Conservatism in metaphysics. Finally, in Chapter 3, I show how a traditional package of Lewisian views consisting of Lewisian graded naturalness, Naturalness as Fundamentality, and Reference Magnetism leads to Nihilism about mereological composition and trumps our talk and thought. Accordingly, I will recommend the adoption of a new package consisting of Schafferian or scientific naturalness, the distinction of naturalness from fundamentality, and a new Reference Magnetism.