Kant and the supposed right to lie

1. Timmermann, Jens (2013). Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95, 36–64. Ca. 12,000 words. Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to non-conclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact. 2. Timmermann, Jens (2025). Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ca. 103,000 words (main body of text) + 4,300 words (appendix). Abstract: In his 1797 essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Love of Humanity’, Kant argues that when only a con dent lie might save a friend, one must, if asked, reply truthfully and thus betray his hiding-place to the person who wants to kill him. This is the first monograph to explore Kant’s essay in detail. Jens Timmermann examines the background of the piece (Kant was provoked by Benjamin Constant and his translator, Carl Friedrich Cramer); the history of the example (which was also discussed by, amongst others, Augustine, Fichte and Johann David Michaelis); the peculiarities of Constant’s version of the case; and Kant’s core argument against Constant: lying, or a right to lie, would undermine contractual rights and spell disaster for all humanity. This rich interpretative resource, which includes a facing-page translation of Kant’s essay, will be of wide interest to Kant scholars and moral philosophers.