Reciprocal-reward–based environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

\n\nReciprocal rewards for cooperative behavior are seen as a way of solving social dilemmas. In fact, reward values should not be fixed, but rather linked to the level of social development. Thus, this work proposes a mechanism by which reciprocal reward values in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game depend on region environmental feedback. Therefore, the reciprocal reward values are non-linear and inversely correlated with the environmental state. Numerical simulations show that the non-linear and dynamic reciprocal reward can significantly improve cooperation compared to the traditional version, which can also reduce social costs to some extent. In addition, a higher level of sensitivity to changes in the environment is beneficial for cooperative evolution. Specifically, while setting reciprocal rewards based on greater local environmental feedback can increase the threshold of temptation b at which cooperators become extinct, its contribution to encouraging cooperation is limited. Furthermore, different interval ranges of b-values will have a corresponding range of local environment to encourage cooperation to achieve the optimum. Finally, the results show that the system has good robustness.\n

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Publication Details

Journal
Springer Link (Chiba Institute of Technology)
Published
2024-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ad8ae5/pdf
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Reciprocal-reward–based environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Springer Link (Chiba Institute of Technology)
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Reciprocal-reward–based environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

article en

Abstract

\n\nReciprocal rewards for cooperative behavior are seen as a way of solving social dilemmas. In fact, reward values should not be fixed, but rather linked to the level of social development. Thus, this work proposes a mechanism by which reciprocal reward values in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game depend on region environmental feedback. Therefore, the reciprocal reward values are non-linear and inversely correlated with the environmental state. Numerical simulations show that the non-linear and dynamic reciprocal reward can significantly improve cooperation compared to the traditional version, which can also reduce social costs to some extent. In addition, a higher level of sensitivity to changes in the environment is beneficial for cooperative evolution. Specifically, while setting reciprocal rewards based on greater local environmental feedback can increase the threshold of temptation b at which cooperators become extinct, its contribution to encouraging cooperation is limited. Furthermore, different interval ranges of b-values will have a corresponding range of local environment to encourage cooperation to achieve the optimum. Finally, the results show that the system has good robustness.\n

Springer Link (Chiba Institute of Technology)
Beijing Normal University (CN), Shanghai Dianji University (CN)
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 41%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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Reciprocal-reward–based environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game · Springer Link (Chiba Institute of Technology) (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS