Demand information sharing strategies in the e-waste reverse supply chain under remanufacturer encroachment risk

Based on the background of the e-waste recycling, this study extends the remanufacturer channel invasion to a scenario in which recyclers might already have a greater grasp of recycling market demand than remanufacturers. In the scenario of demand information asymmetry, we use the contrasting signals game model to examine the interaction effect of recycler information distortion on the remanufacturer’s belief criterion of recycling market scale and its response to the choice of whether or not to exploit the online channel. Recyclers attempt to distort recycling quantity to induce remanufacturers to make incorrect judgments about the recycling market scale and determine incorrect recycling prices. The discrepancy in recycling prices is then profited by recyclers. The study discovered that expanding online channels in a small market would result in costly signal behaviors by recyclers, such as downward distortion of the actual recycling quantity. This downward information distortion exacerbates the dual marginalization. In contrast to the “win–win” situation found in the online channel under information symmetry, the invasion of an online channel under information asymmetry may result in “double losses”. Then we investigate the impact of other practical factors on channel expansion and information-sharing strategy. These conclusions can improve the efficiency of e-waste recycling and promote the process of waste recycling.