From Carbon to Silicon: A Philosophical Case for Surviving Through Mind Uploading

[Introduction] You lie on an operating table, mortally wounded by a car crash. Your doctors present a stunning opportunity: Procedure A – a comprehensive brain scan to upload your mind onto a supercomputer, which would then animate a replacement brainless body – or Procedure B – a conventional (but dangerous) brain transplant to another also brainless new body. With only hours left to live, you must choose quickly and wisely. Yet what does “wisely” mean here? If our aim is survival, we first need a working theory of what survival entails in the face of such radical technology. In what follows, I will argue for choosing Procedure A – uploading one’s mind to a supercomputer – on the grounds that such an action preserves the functional and psychological continuity that, in my view, constitutes personal identity. I will draw on selected theories of personal identity to demonstrate why uploading one’s mind to a supercomputer plausibly satisfies the conditions for survival and then I will consider possible objections and explain how they can be addressed by emphasizing psychological continuity rather than numerical identity of substance. In concluding, I will reflect on why Procedure A remains the most reliable path to preserving me.