The Village in the Distance: Rousseau’s Pity, Smith’s Sympathy, and The Effort to Refine the Inner Moral Nature

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of pity and Adam Smith’s elaboration on the structure of sympathy are potential sources for an innate morality that share broad conceptual similarities applicable for comparison. Rousseau and Smith hold incongruous views in describing the exact capacities of pity/sympathy and on the extent to which man is naturally sociable. To this end, the incorporation of pity and sympathy as individual virtues in the study of ethical action naturally includes the interpersonal realm of family, friends, and solitary strangers. These initially apolitical relationships can also be extended into a study of the utopian proto-village employed by Rousseau in his second discourse. To demonstrate these perspectives, this paper first investigated Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among Men and Emile or On Education before analyzing Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The point of potential unity between the two authors is the shared willingness to promote and utilize philosophic inquiry to understand pity/sympathy as a theoretical origin for moral sentiments that can be intuitively understood and improved upon with reason and proper education. Ultimately, this paper has sought to contribute to the existing literature by clarifying the conceptual similarities and differences between Rousseau's and Smith’s theoretical grasping for an understanding of what man’s compassionate tendencies entail, in what broad manner they should be acted upon, and by what forces they might be impeded.