Political Corruption and Extortion in Developing Countries an Analysis of Public Expectations after Coups

In this inquiry the authors question the interface between the political corruption, extortion and high hopes of the populace after coups in the developing countries. The general aim is to explain how corruption after a coup has influenced citizens to anticipate policy reformation, growth of the economy, and the transparency of the government. In that regard, the case studies of various Asian states are used as well as similar developments in other third world societies. The resultant evidence also highlights the instrumental nature of corruption on facilitating and maintaining coups and the resultant loss of popular trust in government outfits. As a methodological approach, the research is going to be mixed-methodical. A qualitative inquiry, which consists of interviews with common people, political participants, and civically inclined domain experts, is used together with quantitative measurements of focused economic output, corruption product, and surveys of popular opinion prior to regime changes and subsequent to the changes. A combination of these strands brings to the fore greater understanding on how corruption alters government structures and national economic wellbeing in transitional environments. Parallel to this analysis, there is the question on how the effects of extortion and rent seeking processes following staging of coups enhance the challenges to the reconstitution of democratic structures. The empirical evidence indicates that even though a lot of expectations are expected of improved governance policies that come along with regime change it is evident that the availability and persistence of corruption, particularly the extortion of political elite and bureaucratic officials never seem to cease to disappoint such expectations. In many instances, coups have not succeeded in bringing about the expected changes but they have created political instability and stagnant growth of economies. The paper thus ends with a list of anti-corruption measures and governance restructuring that can be taken to dampen the long term harmful repercussions of corruption and strengthen public confidence in interim governments that come to power through coups. Together, the research provides insight into the continuity of corruption and extortion to continue to shape the political buildings of the developing regions following regime changes, and that is a vital piece of advice in providing policymakers and global powerhouse bodies.