EDERALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS: INSIGHTS FROM THE BRITISH AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONS

Federalism remains a pivotal mechanism for managing power distribution in multi-tiered governance systems, especially in culturally diverse nations like the United Kingdom and India. This study is crucial in addressing the rising tensions and inefficiencies emerging from imbalanced power structures and institutional inertia in both countries. It aims to comparatively assess how constitutional frameworks, intergovernmental institutions, and centralization trends impact legislative autonomy, service delivery, and public trust. Employing a qualitative comparative design based on secondary data (2020-2024), the research incorporated thematic analysis and statistical tools-including trend analysis, regression modeling, and correlation tests. Key findings reveal a sharp increase in central legislative interventions in India (from 68% in 2020 to 76% in 2023), with a significant regression coefficient (β = +2.7, R² = 0.93) and rising fiscal autonomy demands (R² = 0.96). Similarly, UK public satisfaction with devolved authority declined (e.g., in Scotland, from 42% to 36%). A cross-tab chi-square test confirmed a significant relationship between inactive intergovernmental institutions and legislative conflicts (χ² = 11.78, p < 0.01). Service delivery analysis showed India’s health policy implementation lagged at 58% compared to the UK’s 74%, with a strong correlation (r = 0.89) between centralization and policy resistance. The overall correlation coefficient (r = 0.91) and multiple regression model (R² = 0.94) substantiate that central dominance strongly predicts regional dissatisfaction. These results imply a systemic erosion of cooperative federalism and call for urgent governance reforms. It is recommended that institutional mechanisms be reactivated, legislative powers rebalanced, and a Federal Performance Index be introduced to enhance transparency and intergovernmental accountability.