INDIVIDUAL PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICES

The study aimed to analyze the factors influencing the designation of municipalities as beneficiaries of special transfers in Brazil, based on Public Choice Theory, which posits that public officials may make decisions driven by electoral interests, thereby compromising the efficient allocation of resources. This is a quantitative study employing a theoretical-deductive method to test hypotheses regarding transfer motivations. Secondary data covered the period from 2020 to 2024 for all 5,569 Brazilian municipalities, using information from the Parliamentary Panel, the Superior Electoral Court, IBGE, and the IPS Brazil Portal. Transfer and voter data were standardized to ensure comparability, and the analysis was conducted using multiple linear regression models to assess the relationship between the volume of resources and the variables of electoral potential, Social Progress Index (SPI), and per capita GDP (GDPpc). The results, with an R² of 28.80%, indicate that electoral interest is a statistically significant determinant in the distribution of resources. The SPI showed a weak but significant correlation, while GDPpc was not statistically significant. It is concluded that vote potential prevails over socioeconomic criteria in the allocation of special transfers, supporting the assumptions of Public Choice Theory and highlighting the need for stronger oversight regarding the use of these resources.